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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GLENN REYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
AMERICAN FOUNDRY AND MA-
CHINE COMPANY, 
Defenda.nt and Appellant 
Case No .. 
7697 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, 
GLENN REYNOLDS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts may be accepted with 
the following important exceptions and additions: 
1. On page 4 of appellant's brief it is stated, uAt the 
same time Clarence Silver directed the defendant com-
pany to purchase a 6 ton chain block (R 121-122.)" The 
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actual situation is expressed at R 95, 167 and at the bot-
tom of R 121. Mr. Silver advised Mr. Mattingly, defend-
ant's employer, to get a Yale and Towne chain block that 
would lift 6 tons. Mr. Silver knew from his own experi-
ence that a Yale and Towne product could be relied upon. 
This was his particular recommendation. 
2. On page 5 of appellant's brief in the middle of the 
page we read, uThe chain block was placed in position 
under the direction of Silver and the hand chain operated 
in accordance with the usual test made by Silver to see 
that the chain block was in functionable condition." 
There was no testing nor inspecting for defects in the 
chain either by the defendant or Mr. Silver (R 142) . 
3. Exception is taken to the following statement of 
appellant as found on page 7 of its brief: ((The chain 
block was manufactured by the McCollum Hoist and 
Chain Company a nationally advertised company whose 
products are known under the trade name as indicated; 
it being a product known in the same sense in the industry 
as a Yale and Towne, Reading and Chrisholm. (301-302, 
3 01, 3 51) " This statement has no value unless it is in-
tended to show that the reputation of the McCollum Com-
pany for the producing of sound and reliable equipment 
is the same as the companies whose names are quoted. The 
evidence does not support this proposition. At R 301, 302 
Mr. Richeda says that while he is familiar with the names 
of companies of competitive products he is not familiar 
with the reputation of the products of McCollum Hoist 
and Chain Company. Likewise at R 350, 351 Mr. Young 
says he used the products of this company twenty years 
ago, but he does not know of their general reputation. 
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4. On pages 8 and 9 of the appellant's brief is a dis-
cussion of the lack of custom in the industry to test and 
inspect new chain blocks. In every instance that such 
testimony was given, it was given over objection and with-
out setting a foundation that makes it material to this 
case, namely, the custom of inspecting and testing an 
instrumentality that is supplied an invitee workman to be 
used for the supplier's business purposes. Since the defend-
ant's liability must rest upon the unusual care incident to 
this particular relationship such evidence of custom with-
out such a relationship is without value. 
5. On page 8 of the appellant's brief it states that 
Mr. Christensen never tested a chain block for his com-
pany uthough the testing was the duty assigned to him by 
the company." Appellant appears to have _overlooked Mr. 
Christensen's testimony at R 250 to the effect that others 
in his company had been assigned that particular work. 
6. On page 9 of appellant's brief appears the ~ollow­
ing: uThe only testing these experts could suggest to deter-
mine defects, particularly the latent defect in the link 
involved, would be a destructive test resulting in a com-
plete loss of the machinery (R 178, 311) ." Appellant 
appears to have overlooked Mr. Christensen's testimony 
(R 197, 198, 212, 255) to the effect that a proof test 
could have been made and had it been made upon the 
particular chain in question, ~he defect in the link that 
broke would have been revealed by its breaking. Had there 
been no such defect, then twice the rated or safe working 
load could have been held by the chain without its destruc-
tion. To reach its point of destruction, a load four times 
the rated capacity would have had to be applied. 
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7 · On page 10 of appellant's brief, Mr. Richeda is 
quoted to the effect that once a full rated capacity is held 
by a chain block for any length of time it is proven and 
need not be further inspected. There is other testimony 
to the contrary by Mr. Christensen as follows (R 255): 
uQ. Now do we understand if you take a brand 
new chain and to use it, not at double the_ rate but 
at just its rated capacity and use it for a period not 
to exceed 50 hours out of a period of 3 weeks that 
now you are going to have some kind of examination 
made? Have you ever heard of such a practice at 
your company or any other company? 
uA. I certainly have. As I stated before a chain 
block is the most abused piece of machinery that is 
probably used." 
8. There is no evidence showing the general reputa-
tion for reliability of the products produced by the McCol-
lum Hoist and Chain Company. The evidence is clear, 
however, that the chain block in question was produced 
by that company and the link broke either because of a 
defective weld or because the link was~nealed, or pos-
sibly both defects had a bearing on the failure of the link. 
It is further clear that had this chain block been subjected 
to a proof test, which is not a destructive test; but a test 
that all reliable manufacturers give such products, and a 
certificate of which test all careful vendees require from 
the manufacturer, such a proof test would have broken 
the defective link and thus removed such a dangerous 
instrument from service. 
There is no evidence that the manufacturer made a 
proof test or any other kind of test and the evidence is 
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undisputed that the defendant made no test whatsoever, 
nor any kind of inspection. 
Appellants contend that the use of the chain block for 
48 hours in suspending the dead weight of the core while 
infra-red treatments were given was a test. In view of the 
evidence as to the purpose of a proof test, the jury was 
quite justified in ignoring Mr. Richeda's extravagant state-
ment that such was a test. 
9. The evidence is clear and uncontroverted that if 
each link of the chain had been carefully inspected for 
cracks in the weld, a crack would have been seen in the 
weld of the link that broke. Mr. Christensen says that the 
crack probably appeared, cc:a considerable time before it 
broke." (R 249, 250) Mr. Richeda, defendant's witness, 
says the link uhad probably been broken at the time that 
the chain was made" (R 316 line 6), and a link by link 
inspection of chains is not an uncommon and unheard of 
practice (R 248, 310). 
It is further undisputed that had the chain been put 
to a proof test, the weakness would have been manifested 
by breaking. These inspections and testing were never 
made either by the manufacturer nor by the defendant. 
10. Concerning the relations of the parties, the facts 
are these: In December, 1948 Mr. Silver, as an independent 
electrical contractor was employed by the defendant to 
repair the defendant's transformer. Eleven years prior 
thereto Mr. Silver's company installed this transformer for 
the defendant. At that time Mr. Silver made a recom-
mendation to the defendant that it acquire and have on 
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hand in case of an emergency a Yale and Towne Chain 
Block that would lift the 6 ton core of the transformer. 
The defendant purchased from the McCollum Hoist and 
Manufacturing Company through one of its affiliated 
companies a 6 ton rated chain block, and for eleven years 
this chain block was available on defendant's premises for 
the particular purpose of lifting the 6 ton core when neces-
sary. This ;chain block was never used until the break down 
of the transformer in December, 1948. When Mr. Silver 
commenced the repair work he sent a number of his em-
ployees to defendant's place of business to do the work, 
among whom was the plaintiff. Since about 200 men 
were thrown out of work pending the repair of the trans-
former, there was a great sense of urgency on the part 
of Mr. Silver and the defendant which resulted in a high 
degree of co-operation between their respective employees. 
For one or two reasons it was mutually decided that the 
quickest way to lift the core from the transformer tank 
was to bring in a truck hoist instead of using the chain 
block, whereupon the defendant immediately employed 
and later paid a Mr. Mettome to do this work. It should 
here be observed that in the defendant's contract with Mr. 
Silver it was in no way contemplated that he should fur-
nish any hoist equipment, and the fact is that the defend-
ant furnished both the truck hoist and the chain block 
which was later used. It was while the plaintiff and his 
fellow employees were still in the process of repairing 
defendant's transformer that defendant's chain block 
broke because of a defect in one of the links. These are 
facts upon which the evidence shows little, if any, dispute 
and they are reiterated here because appellant has based 
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certain arguments on factual premises contrary to those 
here stated. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT NO. I 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
THERE WAS A DUTY ON THE DEFENDANT 
TO TEST AND INSPECT THE CHAIN BLOCK 
ACCORDING TO THE BEST TESTS AVAIL-
ABLE. 
(a) The particular relations of the parties in this case 
were su~h as to place a duty in the defendant to test and 
inspect the chain block. 
(b) Even if the chain block was purchased frmn a 
reputable manufacturer (which is not conceded in this 
case) it cannot be presumed that the chain block was ade-
quatelJ' inspected and tested by the manufacturer unless 
the vendee obtained from the manufacturer a certificate 
to the effect that it had been so tested and inspected. How-
ver, because of the particular relations of the partie~~ 
this case such a presumption, even if it were justified_, did · 
not relieve the defendant itself from. a duty to adequately 
inspect and test. 
(c) There need be no evidence of a standard of care 
slxnving the necessity of inspection or testing before a chain 
block is placed in use when it is purchased new from the 
manufacturer, other tha11, the relations of the parties to 
the instrumentality, the type of work involved, and the 
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danger to life and li1nb involved by the use of the instru-
ment if defective. Once these are in evidence· the jury 
ma.y then apply the reasonably prudent 1nan doctrine. 
(d) To establish his case sufficiently to go to a jury, 
it is not necessary in this case for plaintiff to show any 
particular practice or custom to inspect or test chain 
blocks. 
POINT NO. II 
ONE SUPPLYING A CHATTEL FOR THE USE 
OF ANOTHER AS WAS DONE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE HAS A 
DUTY TO DISCOVER LATENT DEFECTS 
THEREIN. 
POINT NO. III 
THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE IN 
THE DEFENDANT IN PURCHASING FROM 
THE MANUFACTURER THE CHAIN BLOCK 
IN THIS CASE AND THE COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS IT DID 
IN INSTRUCTION NO. V. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
MR. CHRISTENSEN TO GIVE HIS OPINION 
AS TO WHETHER THE CHAIN BLOCK 
SHO·ULD HAVE BEEN INSPECTED AFTER IT 
HAD BEEN IN USE FOR A PERIOD OF 48 
HOURS. 
10 
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POINT NO. V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE MAT-
TERS MENTIONED IN APPELLANT'S POINTS 
NUMBERED V, VI AND VII FOR REASONS 
ALREADY DISCUSSED HEREIN. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
THERE WAS A DUTY ON THE DEFENDANT 
TO TEST AND INSPECT THE CHAIN BLOCK 
ACCORDING TO THE BEST TESTS AVAIL-
ABLE. 
(a) The particular relatio1zs of the parties in this case 
were sttch as to place a duty in the defendant to test and 
inspect the chain block. 
The relations of the plaintiff and defendant were such 
as to place an especially high degree of care in the defend-
ant toward the plaintiff with reference to the safety of the 
instrumentality which defendant furnished plaintiff. In 
spite of appellant's view to the contrary, respondent at the 
time of his injury was engaged in the business of servicing 
an instrument for the defendant, on defendant's premises, 
at defendant's urgent request, was using an instrumentality 
furnished by the defendant, and was using it along with his 
fellow employees and employer for the particular purpose 
for which it was supplied by the defendant and, at the 
time, operated by defendant'semployees as they worked in 
11 
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co-operation to get the work done for which Mr. Silver 
and his employees had been called. 
It appears to the respondent that the vital questions 
in this case are: What, if any, is the liability of a vendee 
of an instrumentality, in which there is a defect from the 
time of its manufacture by the vendor, after the vendee 
in the furthering of his business interest supplies it to a 
third party who is injured as a result of the defect? Does 
such a supplier have the same duty of inspecting and test-
ing as the manufacturer under all situations? Or does he 
have the same duty under limited situations, or does he 
have any duty at all with respect to the instrumentality? 
The questions above have arisen very frequently where 
the supplier is furnishing elevator service to those who use 
the service to transact business in the building which the 
elevator serves. This situation is so common and the cases 
arising therefrom so numerous, that elevator cases are 
treated in legal treatises as a subject by itself which fact 
should not blind us to the basic legal questions which are 
present regardless of what the particular instrumentality 
may be. In these cases the law has placed a duty of a high 
degree of ,care upon those who would invite anyone upon 
their premises for business purposes and then place at the 
invitee's disposal or for his service an instrumentality, espe-
cially where the defects, if any, are latent and not readily 
observable by the invitee but which could be detected by 
the invitor by the best tests available. 
In 18 Am Jur. 528, we read: 
uThe owner or operator of an elevator is not 
excused from the diligence otherwise exacted of him 
12 
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by the fact that the elevator in question was con-
structed by a competent and skillful manufacturer, 
because the manufacturer is to be considered a mere 
agent or servant in its construction, for whose want ~ 
of care, the owner or operator is responsible. The 
obligation of care and foresight rests on the person 
who has had the elevator constructed and he cannot 
shift it from himself to another. Therefore, if an 
innocent person suffers injuries by reason of some 
defect in the mechanism, the owner or operator is 
generally liable for the injuries, unless the defect 
or default was latent and could not have been dis-
covered by a careful examination according to the 
best tests reasonably practicable." 
It appears, therefore, that the negligence of the manu-
facturer in the construction of an instrumentality is im-
puted to anyone who later, as owner, supplies it for the 
use of another where the supplier has a pecuniary or busi-
ness interest. The authors of the above quotation arrive 
at this conclusion by suggesting that the producer is an 
agent or servant of the supplier in the construction of the 
instrumentality. Although this is one way to approach the 
problem, the cases generally have developed a theory that 
deals directly with a supplier's responsibilities regardless of 
how he acquired the instrumentality. In developing a 
theory of responsibility for a supplier the courts have not 
been concerned as to how the supplier obtained the instru-
mentality, or how long the defendant has had it, or whether 
it has been in use; neither have the courts been concerne-d 
whether the supplier has retained control of its operation, 
or has placed it in plaintiff's hands as bailee to operate. 
These matters are merely incidental to the one controlling 
and dominating fact for which they look, viz., whether the 
13 
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defendant has supplied the plaintiff, or the plaintiff's 
employer, with an instrumentality under circumstances 
in which not only the plaintiff is being benefited, but also 
in which the defendant has a pecuniary or business interest, 
and whether the supplier first took whatever steps· were 
reasonably necessary to see that the instrumentality was 
free from defect and was capable of performing the job 
for which it was furnished. 
This problem is treated rather exhaustively in 44 
A.L.R. 1048 (1926) where under subheading IV is dis-
cussed the uLiability of contractee with respect to injuries 
resulting from defects in instrumentalities furnished for 
the purposes of the stipulated work." 
It will be noted from this annotation that the New 
York Supreme Court of Appeals in the leading Coughtry 
case emphasizes that the plaintiff was injured while em-
ployed by the contractor working as an invitee on defend-
ant's premises and scaffolding erected by the defendant, 
facts which the court thinks established ( 1) the business 
interest of the defendant and (2) the implication that 
defendant represents the structure to be safe since it was 
supplied by defendant for the express purpose of induc-
ing the men who were to do the work to go upon it. This 
principle· is well stated in a recent California case Moran 
vs Zenith Oil Co., 206 P2d. 679 (June 7, 1949): 
rrwhen the occupant of land knowingly per-
mits a person to enter the premises for the purpose 
of performing acts which the workman has been 
employed to do, the proprietor is obligated to exer-
cise reasonable care for the protection of the toiler. 
14 
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He 'lnust supplJ1 a reasonably safe place in which 
the zvork is to be done and n1ust furnish and 1nain.-
tain such tools and appliances as are necessary and 
reasonably safe for use in the operations. A laborer 
so enzployed is chargeable u'ith neither a concealed 
nor a latent defect in tbe equipment supplied. In 
the event he is i11 jured as a result of a latent defect 
in the instrunzentalities furnished him of which he 
is i gnora.nt, be 111 ay recm}er d antages for resulting 
injuries, if it is shou./n that the en~ployer, licensor 
or proprietor kne1v or by the exercise of reasonable 
care should have kno11In of the defect and has failed 
to effect a repair thereof or to wprn the workman. 
(italics supplied) 
u * * * Appellant invited respondent to work 
upon its premises and furnished him with its own 
instrumentality which proved to be in disrepair. 
That the defect was not readily apparent is estab-
lished by the fact that the faulty cable was sub-
jected to the usual inspection before use, once by 
appellant's employee, McGee, in the presence of 
the crew foreman and again by the latter's crew on 
the day of the accident. When on the latter occa-
sion it was scraped with a knife, shiny steel appeared 
beneath the rust. It cannot be said that the rust 
covering the cable was itself an indication of immi-
nent peril. Many witnesses testified that all cables 
in the area accumulate rust after short exposure 
to the elements. Concededly, appellant may not 
have known of the dangerous condition of the cable, 
but on the facts established it cannot be said that the 
jury 1uas arbitrary in finding that by the exercise of 
reasonable care appellant could have discovered the 
peril and thus have prevented injury to any em-
ployee. McGee [ supt. for appellant] testified that 
the cable had been hanging in the derrick in excess 
of five years and to his knowledge had never been 
15 
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greased or oiled against the elements or tested for 
tensile strength. In addition, there was expert testi-
mony that other operating oil companies serviced 
their hanging cables every two or three years to 
prevent corrosion and deterioration. Such lack of 
diligence to prevent injury to workmen falls below 
the high standard of care required in employing 
those who are to work under circumstances involv-
ing a high risk to personal safety." (italics supplied) 
An earlier California case, but still quite recent is 
Sheward Et Al vs Bullock's Inc. Et AI (120 P2d 142). The 
plain tiff Mrs. Robert Sheward, while sitting in a metal 
chair in the beauty parlor of defendant, Bullocks, for the 
purpose of receiving a treatment, was precipitated to the 
floor when the front right leg of the ~chair was broken. 
She sustained serious personal in jury. Among other things 
the court said: 
((Plaintiffs base their cause of action upon the 
alleged negligence of appellants in the manufactur-
ing and assembling of the cast iron chair which the 
latter had sold to Bullock's, Inc. some nine months 
before plaintiff received her injuries. On receipt of 
it, Bullock's carefully inspected the chair and dur-
ing all of the time the chair was in the beauty parlor, 
it underwent tests for its strengtb and soundness. 
Bullock's had an employee weighing 250 lbs. to test 
the chair twice weekly by riding back and forth 
across the floor. He also washed, oiled and inspected 
it at the same time. Such care exen~plified the duty 
imposed upon the vendee of a n~anufacfttrer. Re-
statement of the Law of Torts, Section 396. 
If the same degree of care which was used by Bullock's 
in testing the chair had been exercised by defendant in the 
16 
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case now before the court, the weakness in the link would 
have been discovered, and we repeat the court's words: 
usuch care exemplified the duty imposed upon the vendee 
of a manufacturer." In other words the duty of testing 
and inspecting by the best means available is definitely 
imposed upon the supplier of an instrumentality where 
the supplier has a business interest. 
The views of Harper on Torts at Section 105 and the 
cases and annotations referred to above have been adopted 
by the restators of the Law of Torts, Section 392 which is 
quoted in appellant's brief at pp 38-39. In commenting on 
sub-paragraph 2, Section 392 the restators make this state-
ment: 
usection 392 states the rule under which a 
peculiar liability is imposed upon one supplying 
chattels for another's use because of the fact that 
the use is one in which the supplier has a business 
interest. A person so supplying goods is required 
not only to give warning of dangers which he knows 
are involved in the use of the article, or which, from 
facts within his knowledge, he knows are likely to 
be so involved but also to subject the article to such 
an inspection as the danger of using it in a defective 
condition makes it reasonable to require. The addi-
tional duty of inspection thrown upon the person 
so supplying chattels for a use in which he has a 
business interest as compared with the absence of 
any such duty when he has no business interest in 
the use for which the chattel is supplied, is analogous 
to the duty of inspection imposed upon one who 
permits another to come upon his land for his busi-
ness purpose and the absence of such duty where the 
permission is granted for any other reason.,, 
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Section 392 together with the restator's comment as 
above quoted was cited with approval by the Supreme 
Court of Ohio in the case of Hilleary vs Bromley Et AI 
(January 1946) 64 NE 2d 835. This case is especially 
instructive here because of the facts: 
· uln 1940 the defendants ~· * * were partners 
::· * * and were engaged in the business of furnish-
ing, selling and applying roll siding on dwelling 
houses. 
uPrior to April· 6, 1940 they agreed to apply 
siding on a dwelling house on Hasack Street in the 
City of Columbus. The defendants in turn entered 
into a sub-contract with the plaintiff whereby the 
latter agreed to apply the siding on the house in 
question, and the defendants agreed to furnish the 
plaintiff, for such purpose, equipment consisting of 
ladders, jacks, and planks. 
((Pursuant to such agreement, the defendants 
furnished and delivered to the plaintiff, at the site 
where the siding was to be applied, the equipment 
above mentioned, with the knowledge that the lad-
ders so furnished were expe~cted to bear the weight 
of one or two men, the jacks, the planks and suffi-
cient material which might weigh about 75 lbs., 
to cover the surface being worked upon. 
uThe plaintiff inspected the ladders each day 
he used them but discovered no defects therein. 
There was no inspection of the ladders to determine 
the weight, stress or strain which they would bear 
except by the manufacturer thereof, and the evi-
dence discloses no specific inspection of the ladder 
in question by defendants for any purpose. The 
ladders were painted by the defendants after they 
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came into their possession and before they were. 
delivered to the plaintiff, which, to some extent~ 
obscured the grain of the wood. 
u.on April 6, 1940, the fourth day after the 
work had been started on this job, the plaintiff 
placed three of the ladders against the side of the 
house approximately ten feet apart. The jacks were 
hooked upon and suspended from the upper rungs 
of the ladder and in turn supported two planks 
extending between the ladders. While the plaintiff 
and a helper were standing on one of these planks, 
suspended between an end ladder and the middle 
ladder, the inside rail or upright of the end ladder 
broke into the third rung and then split at the rung 
·down past fourth rung and out between the fourth 
and :fifth rungs, with the result that the plank upon 
which the plaintiff was standing and the plaintiff 
himself were precipitated to the ground, a distance 
of about sixteen feet. Plaintiff's foot was severely 
injured, resulting in a permanent impairment. 
u.A subsequent examination of the ladder rail 
indicated that the split followed the grain of the 
wood. The defendants claim that the ladders had 
been inspected before they were delivered to the 
plaintiff, but the record discloses no· evidence of any 
particular inspection by any particular person. 
u.The plaintiff brought. this action to recover 
damages for his injuries alleging in his petition that 
they resulted from the negligence of the defendants 
in furnishing him a ladder which was defective and 
inadequate for the purpose for which it was to be 
d "·~*" use ... -· ., 
The court upholds the plaintiff's views concerning 
liability and gives a well reasoned opinion for so doing. In 
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view of its length we shall not quote further from the case 
hut urge its careful consideration upon the court. 
The principles thus far discussed concerning a sup-
plier's duties toward the users of a chattel which is supplied 
in the furtherance of the supplier's business interest are 
especially applicable where there is great potential danger 
of serious injury and loss of life if the chattel fails in doing 
the thing for whi,ch it is supplied. In the case at bar the 
chattel which is supplied was furnished to lift and suspend 
over a number of workmen a weight of 12,000 pounds of 
a relatively bulky mechanism, that is, bulky in relation 
to the amount of space left in which the men could work 
in the small building which housed the transformer, and 
also bulky in relation to the size of the men themselves. 
To emphasize the peril of the situation we need only reflect 
what would have happened to the men below if the link 
had broken a few moments sooner when the core had not 
yet started into the container. What chance would the 
men below have had to escape being crushed to death? 
With reference to the importance of considering the 
presence of great danger and its relation to the amount of 
care required, our Supreme Court has said in the case of 
White vs Pinney, 108P2 249: 
uo£ course what constitutes (reasonable care' 
or the care that would be exercised by a person of 
ordinary prudence may vary with the nature of the 
instrumentality employed, that is, the care must be 
proportionate to the probability of injury that may 
arise to others. For example, in cases where wires 
carry a dangerous current of electricity or where 
explosives are handled, and the result of negligence 
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might be death or serious accidents, a greater care 
is required because of the danger inherent in the 
instrumentality. With such things an a.ct may well 
be negligence which would not be such with instru-
mentalities of less potential danger to others. Where 
the danger is great the care exercised must be com-
mensurate with it. The degree of care required in 
law is proportionate to the dangers that reasonable 
men would apprehend under .the circumstances. 
Failure to exercise such degree of care is negligence,, 
and negligence is the gravamen of the action." 
(b) Even if the chain block was purchased from a 
reputable 1nanufacturer (which is not conceded in this 
case) it cannot be presumed that the chain block was ade-
quately inspected and tested by the manufacturer unless 
the vendee obtained from the manufaclurer a certificate 
to the effect that it had been so tested and inspected. How-
ever, because of the particular relations of the parties.JJkau 
this case such· a presunzption, even if it were justified:J Mi 
not relieve the defendant itself from a duty to adequately 
inspect a1td test . 
..-MV 
This is a~~- answer to appellant's Point I (a). 
Appellant's general statemen~der this sub-heading 
at the bottom of page 12 of this · is neither a correct 
statement of fact concerning the manufacturer, nor is 
it a correct statement of the law as applied to this case. 
As heretofore mentioned under 3 of respondent's excep-
tions to Appellant's statement of facts there is no evidence 
supporting the proposition that the McCollum Hoist and 
Manufacturing Company of Downers Grove, Illinois had 
the general reputation for producing reliable products. For 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
' /J . I "7..' "-+- .., ' . ": ., ~ _ ' I 
?J ..:/.!cat?·//,~_...,~,· d ~/1/'7:/C/~'o..L-- tc~7A~.a'- .r-.v~k'Z: 
facts showi~g tha~ such a~ttm:ption--~not .. ~x::teti 
9-y- ~fte. e 'idstlso, see discussion hereafter under Point III. 
However, under the particular facts of this case, the 
law does not permit the defendant to shift his responsibility 
to the manufacturer even if it had purchased a Yale and 
Towne chain block, as Mr. Silver requested them to do, 
or any other . make regardless of reputation. A leading 
case supporting this proposition is Hegeman vs Western 
Railroad Corporation 13 NY 9; 64 Am. Dec. 517, ( 18 55) . 
In that case plaintiff was uinjured by the car in which he 
was sea ted, being wrecked. through a defect in the axel.,. 
The court said: 
uTwo questions were presented for the con-
sideration of the Jury: ( l) Was there a test known 
to and used by others and which should have been 
known to a skillful manufacturer, by which the 
concealed defect in the axel of the car should have 
been detected; and if so, then ( 2) Was the in jury 
to the plaintiff ·the consequence of that imperfec-
tion? There was evidence tending to establish these 
facts, which the jury have found; and the ques-
tion returns, ~can the defendant, who neither ap-
plied the test nor caused it to be applied by the 
manufacturer insist that this accident could not 
have been avoided by the utmost degree of care and 
skill in the preparation of the means of conveyance,' 
or ~That they used all precautions, as far as human 
care and foresight would go, for the safety of the 
plaintiff, as one of their passengers'? It seems to 
me that there can be but one answer to the question. 
ul t was said that carriers of passengers are not 
insurers. This is true. It is also said that they [the 
defendants] were not required to become smelters 
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of iron or manufacturers of ·cars in the prosecution. 
of their business. This also must be conceded. What 
the law does require, is that they shall furnish a 
sufficient car to secure the safety of their passengers, 
by the exercise of the utmost care and skill in its 
preparation. They may construct it themselves, or 
avail themselves of the services of others; but in 
either case, they engage that all that well-directed 
skill can do has been done for the accomplishment 
of this object. A good reputation upon the part of 
the builder is very well in itself, but ought not to 
be accepted by the public, or the law as a substitute 
for a good vehicle. What is demanded, and what is 
undertaken by the corporation, is not merely that 
the manufacturer had the requisite capacity but 
·that it was skillfully exercised in the particular in-
stance. (Italics supplied) If to this extent they are 
not responsible, there is no security for individuals 
or the public. 
ult is perfectly understood that latent defects 
may exist, undiscoverable by the most vigilant 
examination, when the fabric is completed, from 
which the most serious accidents have and may oc-
cur. This is well known, as the evidence in this suit 
tended to prove; and the jury have found that a 
simple test (that of bending the iron after the 
axel was formed and before it was connected with 
the wheel) existed by which it could be detected. 
This should have been known and applied by men 
<professing skill in that particular business.' It was 
not known, or if known, was not applied by these 
manufacturers. It was not used by the defendant, 
nor did they inquire whether it had been used by the 
builders. (Italics supplied) They relied upon an 
external examination, which they were bound to 
know would not, however, faithfully prosecuted, 
guard their passengers against the dangers arising 
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from concealed defects in the· iron of the axei or 
in the manufacture of them. For this omissio~ of 
duty, or want of skill, the learned judge held, and 
I think correctly, that they were liable." 
The annotation at 64 AM. Dec. 525 shows that this doc-
trine is well established in New York and that the text 
book writers adopt it and reject the contrary view held by 
Michigan as unsound. 
This case is quoted extensively with approval by a 
California case, Tread well vs Whittier ( 18 8 9) 2 2 Pac 2 66. 
On page 15 of appellant's brief it states that uno 
question was raised in the pleadings as to the fact that 
the chain block was purchased from a reliable manufac-
ture·r." Reference to plaintiff's paragraph 6 of his com-
plaint as amended will show the allegation that u:the break-
ing of said link was a direct and proximate result of the 
inadequate, defective and latent construction by the de-
fendant or its agent from whom it obtained said chain 
block." 
(c) There need be no evide11,ce of a standard of care 
showing the necessity of inspection or testing before a chain 
block is placed in use when it is purchased new from the 
manufacturer, other than the relations of the parties to 
the instrumentality, the type of work involved, and the 
danger to life and li1nb involved by the use of the instru-
ment if defective. Once these are in evidence the jury 
may then a.pply the reasonably prudent n~an doctrine. 
This sub-heading is in answer to appellant's Point I 
(b). 
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Appellant's general statement under Point I (b) is 
incorrect in that it fails to recognize that the standard of 
care is determined by the particular relations of the parties, 
the evidence concerning which is ample in this case. 
Appellant then quotes from some cases supporting 
the idea that the custom of other companies is the test of 
due .care. Here again appellant fails to see significance in 
the relations of the parties in the case at bar. In each of 
the cases cited by appellant there is a master-servant 
relationship where custom has had an important bearing 
on setting a standard of due care, although even in such 
cases custom is only a criteria. In negligence cases other 
than master-servant cases Mr. Justice Holmes' statement 
in 189 US 468 has been the generally accepted doctrine: 
~(What usually is done may be evidence· of what ought to 
be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard 
of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied 
with or not." For an excellent discussion of the subject see 
68 ALR 1400. On page 1403 of this annotation where the 
annotator is discussing negligence cases generally, there is 
cited a Michigan Case under the sub-heading Elevators, 
which is very instructive. We quote: 
uin 209 Michigan 385, 177 NW 139, where 
the death of an elevator passenger had resulted from 
a defect in a U-bolt, which bolt had been in use 
eighteen years although defective when installed, it 
appearing that every ninety days, meanwhile, the 
elevator had been inspected in the customary man-
ner by professional inspectors; that (it was not the 
practice or custom of elevator inspectors, in making 
inspections, to take out bolts of this character for 
inspection or examination; that not only was this 
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not the· custom, but that such a thing had never 
been heard of in practice.' The court held in view 
of some expert testimony as to the variability of 
metals and the need of inspecting those articles upon 
which human life depends, that the customary in-
spection was not conclusive on the court or jury." 
Although appellant's quotations under the sub-head-
ing now under discussion are master-servant cases a care-
. ' 
ful reading of all of each of the cases cited will show addi-
tional facts, circumstances, and distinctions from the case 
at bar which further prevent them from being good 
authority to overcome the results of the trial court in the 
case now before the court. 
Appellant's citation of the GrandT runk Railroad Com-
pany vs lves on Page 19 of its brief is also quoted on page 
1402 of the article in 68 ALR referred to above. When 
one reads the balance of the sentence quoted in appellant's 
brief, together with the entire opinion of the court, one 
can well understand why the annotator at p 1402 says: celt 
is questionable whether the fact of the mere custom of 
railroads as to warnings at street crossings was actually the 
point under consideration, or adopted by the court as the 
standard." The annotator observes that if mere custom 
was the point under consideration, then it is inconsistent 
with later rulings of the Supreme Court. 
On pp 23-25 of appellant's brief, there is quoted some 
testimony of Don Rosenblatt to the effect that it would 
be necessary to destroy a link if it were to be tested as to its 
being annealed. And on pp 25-26 Mr. Christensen's testi-
mony is quoted to the effect that a new chain block-any 
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new chain block-could be given a proof test without re~ 
vealing necessarily an unannealed link. We have no argu-
ment with this, nor need we be concerned with it. Respond-
ent is not required to show that the defect was an un-
annealed link. All he had to show was that there was a 
defect-any kind of defect-in the link and that the 
defect would have been revealed by a test known to the 
industry. And Mr. Christensen testified that a proof .test 
would have revealed the defect by breaking the defective 
link. (R 211, 212) 
The remainder of appellant's argument under Point 
II (b) is based on the premise that the standard of care was 
the same as the custom elsewhere. The discussion above 
has attempted to show that ( 1) There is no evidence show-
ing any custom of parties in a similar relation as plaintiff 
and defendant herein, and ( 2) even if there were such 
evidence, it would not be controlling, but only influential 
on the jury. 
(d) To establish his case sufficiently to go to a jury, 
it is not necessary in this case for plaintiff to show any 
particular practice or custom to inspect or test chain blocks. 
(c) 
This point is in answer to appellant's Point I ~. 
Appellant appears to find fault with plaintiff for 
changing theories during the trial. If it is censurable to 
learn of facts during the trial, of which plaintiff and his 
counsel were not aware prior thereto, then appellant is 
justified in this attack. Neither the plaintiff nor his counsel 
knew that the defect was in the weld until after the con-
ference in Judge Van Cott's chambers. This meeting. with 
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Judge VanCott did leave plaintiff's counsel with the defi-
nite impression that as long as the defect appeared to be 
latent he was not going to permit the case to go to the 
jury· The judge's views, we believed, were in error in 
view of the cases cited herein, but we realized our case 
would be prejudiced at that stage of the proceedings unless 
the defect could be shown to be one observable by the 
unaided eye. With this thought in mind Mr. Wilkinson 
took the link and the section that had been cut from it , 
to Mr. Christensen and asked him to look at them-and it 
was the first time he had had such an opportunity-to see 
if there was anything about the link that would indicate 
a defect other than the defect of excessive brittleness or 
lack of annealing. After examining both pieces he un-
equivocally said that the break was not from the lack of 
annealing but from a defective weld. This was a surprise 
to us, but one which we came to welcome, because of 
Judge Van Cott's restricted view of defendant's duties. 
Mr. Christensen and Mr. Richeda thereafter both testified 
that a defect in the weld very probably would have been 
observed by inspection before the break. (R 246-251, 
315, 316) 
Appellant's· counsel bring this matter up, they say, 
so that the court umay properly appraise the testimony of 
Mr. Christensen and to appraise the shift in position of 
Plaintiff during the trial." We welcome the court's ap-
praisal of these facts. The trial judge and jury took due 
note of it also. But we hasten to emphasize that the basic 
facts and theories of this case were not changed by this 
new information.. On the contrary, it gave emphasis to 
them, namely, that there was a defect not only observable 
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by a known test to which the chain block could and should 
have been put, but also a defect which could have been 
found by a link by link inspection. 
Appellant says that the holding of the dead weight of 
the transformer core for 48 hours was a sufficient test to 
relieve defendant from its duty to test. It has already been 
shown, however, that the industry considers a proof test 
one which subjects the chain to twice its rated capacity 
and a destructive test one which submits the chain to four 
times its rated capacity. Can it be possible that appellant 
actually believes that where the risk of human life and limb 
is involved we can accept as a test of this instrument's 
capacity the lifting and holding for 48 hours the exact 
weight at which it is rated without taking any particular 
stress during that time? Do they actually argue that where 
the risk of human life and limb is involved there should 
be no effort to determine to some extent whether there is a 
margin of safety to protect against unusual stresses and 
strains as the chain moves over the wheel or strains from 
other causes? Do they argue that this is a test at all? 
It may be that an employee in an employee-employer 
relationship is accustomed to take a -risk with instruments 
furnished by his employer and by that custom he may learn 
to make due allowance for defects and so act accordingly. 
But where plaintiff is a business invitee of defendant and 
defendant furnishes him an instrumentality to do the 
work which he has been called to do by the defendant and 
the work is of such a nature that the instrument must be 
sound or lives and limbs may be risked, then that plaintiff 
is entitled under the law to a protection considerably great-
er than the utest," so called, that the appellant advocates. 
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POINT NO. II 
ONE SUPPLYING A CHATTEL FOR THE USE 
OF ANOTHER AS WAS DONE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF. THIS CASE HAS A DUTY 
TO DISCOVER LATENT DEFECTS THEREIN. 
This point is in a~swer to appellant's Point No. II. 
When Appellant says that the chain block was furn-
ished plaintiff as a gratuity and not in furtherance of a 
business interest, it appears to base such a conclusion on 
( 1) the supposition that ((The Silver Company employed 
a hoist operated by a truck to lift the transformer out of 
the metal container both during the period of the initial 
repair and during the first lifting of the lengthy remodel-
ing and repair which followed," and ( 2) the- supposition 
that because Mr. Silver used the instrument that was ac-
quired and supplied by the defendant for this purpose 
that it was a gratuity, and therefore the defendant had no 
business interest therein. 
The first supposition above is directly contradictory 
to the undisputed evidence of Mr. Silver at R 100 wherein 
it is stated that the defendant employed and ·paid for Mr. 
Mettome's service to do the first hoist work. Mr. Silver 
did not employ Mr. Mettome. (see also R 138). 
The second assumption above indicates a misunder-
standing of what constitutes a business interest of the de-
fendant and rather than labor what to us appears obvious 
and wh~t has heretofore been dis:cussed we shall submit it. 
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POINT NO. III 
THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE IN 
THE DEFENDANT IN PURCHASING FROM 
THE MANUFACTURER THE CHAIN BLOCK 
IN THIS CASE, AND THE COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS IT DID 
IN INSTRUCTION NUMBER IV. 
This point is in answer to appellant's Point No. III. 
Cases have already been cited and quoted herein on 
the questions raised under this sub-heading of appellant's 
argument. It has also been noted herein that plaintiff in-
cluded in his complaint (Paragraph 6 as amended) this 
matter of negligence in the defendant in the acquiring of 
the chain block. Appellant says further that uthe record 
is absolutely barren of any evidence to support such a 
claim if it had been made. ::· * ::· The jury could not infer 
from any fact presented to it or any issue properly be-
fore it that the supplier of the chain block to the defendant 
was not of the most satisfactory reputation and the high-
est integrity." 
In answer to the above we submit the following facts 
from which the jury could make such an inference: 
1. The chain block, while in new condition, broke 
with a load exactly equal to its rated capacity. 
2. Mr. Christensen's testimony as found at R 213 
beginning on line 3 8 and reading to R 215 line 21 to the 
effect that because of the size of the chain and the kind 
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of metal used, uthe manufacturer overrated the chain 
-very considerably." 
3. Neither Mr. Christensen, nor Mr. Silver, both of 
whom had used and been around chain blocks for many 
years knew or had heard of the McCollum Chain and 
Manufacturing Company prior to their experience with 
the chain block in question. (R 172, 167, 301-302) Nor 
did Mr. Young know of its reputation. (R 3 50} 
4. The weld was defective. 
5. The link was unannealed. 
6. The chain was never submitted to a proof test. 
There is little, if any, doubt that such a test would be 
given by a reputable company in view of plaintiff's exhibit 
A. The following is taken from page 568 of said exhibit: 
UPROOF TESTS 
6 (a) All chains shall be proof tested by· subjecting 
it to the proof test load prescribed in Table I for the re-
spective size chain, and when so tested it shall stand these 
loads without showing any defects. 
(b) When requested the manufacturer shall furn-
ish a certificate of proof test to the purchaser or his repre-
. '' sentattve. 
In connection with the above, Mr. Christensen testi-
fied, as has already been noted, that had this particular 
chain been put to a proof test, it would have broken (R 
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211 line 2 6, to R 212 line 7) . It is further observed that 
the defendant did not produce any evidence of having ac-
quired from the manufacturer a certificate that the chain 
block had been proof tested. 
Reference is made to Mr. Christensen's testimony 
(R 195) concerning plaintiff's Exhibit A from which I 
quote: uThe publications of this society are regarded as of 
the highest class and as recommendations for methods of 
testing and care of machinery of this type." 
POINT NO. IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
MR. CHRISTENSEN TO GIVE HIS OPINION 
AS TO WHETHER THE CHAIN BLO-CK 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSPECTED AFTER IT 
HAD BEEN IN USE FOR A PERIOD OF 48 
HOURS. 
This point is in answer to appellant~s Point IV. 
The question which appellant claims is in error is 
found at the top of page 45 of appellant's brief. The ob-
jection by appellant to the question prior thereto which 
appellant quotes on page 44 of its brief was sustained. The 
question under consideration then is: uln your opinion, 
should this have been inspected after it had been used for 
a period of 48 hours holding a weight of 6 tons~ 
Appellant's objections to this question are as follows: 
I. That Mr. Christensen was not an expert in this field, 
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because uthe testing of chains as such was not part of his 
job" as a metallurgist, 
2. That an expert may not testify as to probabilities, 
3. That there were no facts in evidence upon which 
to base such a question, 
4. ·That the question was phrased improperly and, 
5. Their objection expressed on page 46 in the last 
paragraph under Point No. IV but which is not sufficiently 
clear to us for us either to admit or deny. 
Obje.ction 1 is without merit because although Mr. 
Christensen does not test chains as such he has tested welds 
and mate~ials exactly similar to a chain (R 250). Further-
more his education and long experience in the field of 
metallurgy eminently qualify him as an expert concerning 
the properties of metals generally. (R 193, 194) 
As to Objection 2 we submit that experts may testify 
as to probabilities. 
Concerning Objection 3 there is evidence to the effect 
that the core was 6 tons in weight, all of which was sus-
pended by the chain block 48 hours shortly prior to the 
occasion when the link broke ( R 1 0 3, 1 51 ) . 
If there is any merit to appellant's Obje.ctions 4 and 
5 above they certainly did not prejudice the appellant's 
case in view of Mr. Christensen's answer, the court's in-
structions to the jury, and all the other evidence upon 
which the jury could soundly base its verdict. 
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POINT NO. V 
THE ~OURT DID NOT ERR IN THE MATTERS 
MENTIONED IN APPELLANT'S POINTS NUM-
BERED V, VI AND VII FOR REASONS AL-
READY DISCUSSED HEREIN. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should enter its order affirming the judg-
ment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILKINSON & SMOOT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
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